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The rise of the Labour left in the 1970s and early 1980s culminated in a number of important organisational changes designed to give more influence to activists within the party grassroots.
The commitment to internal reform, promoted by groups like the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, centred on a number of issues to do with policy formation and candidate selection.
On assuming the leadership in 1983 Neil Kinnock, an erstwhile standard bearer of the left, began to break with his former comrades. One critical way in which he did so was to press for a system of One Member One Vote whereby everybody belonging to the party would have a say in candidate selection. This direct form of democracy would have challenged Labour's newly enhanced representative structures and, in so doing, the increasing influence of left activists within the organisation.
Kinnock did not succeed at his first attempt to introduce pure OMOV in 1984. Following the 1987 election defeat significant reforms did take place whereby members obtained the right to play some role in leadership and candidate selection ballots. Most importantly the leadership, through an increasingly compliant National Executive Committee, began to exert increased control over the symbolically important business of by-election candidate selection.
1 In a series of controversial cases the centre demonstrated its determination to impose its will on regional and local parties. It did so by the use of a special NEC taskforce, or panel, charged with coordinating selection procedures. In many cases the process was straightforward but in several it was not. The workings of the NEC by-election taskforce are important because they offer an insight into the origins of 'panelism', a system whereby de facto control of candidate selection passes from the ordinary voluntary membership to the party professionals.
By-elections offer a peculiar challenge to parties and single results can and do have serious political consequences. The shock Liberal victory at Orpington in 1962 undermined confidence in the then Conservative premier Harold Macmillan and helped precipitate his resignation.
Similarly the party's poor third place in the Bradford North contest of 1990 reinforced Margaret
Thatcher's precarious position and she was forced out soon after. Canavan, was expelled from the party when he opted to fight his own seat having failed to win the nomination. His comfortable election to the Scottish parliament appeared to vindicate his stance against 'control freakery' and succeeded in highlighting the wider popular support that existed for his position.
The constitutional reform process has also produced a new tier of regional government for the capital city. In 2000 Londoners are due to vote for a new assembly and will also have the chance to choose the country's first directly elected mayor. Labour MP and leading left-winger Ken Livingstone has already expressed an interest in standing. Livingstone was previously leader of the last capital wide strategic authority, the Greater London Council. A key centre of opposition to the then Thatcher government, the GLC was abolished in the mid-1980s. Despite his campaigning abilities and media skill, Livingstone's opposition to government economic policies has raised speculation that Blair and the central party will prevent him becoming Labour's mayoral candidate. This will almost certainly be done through an NEC panel empowered to exclude nominees from a decisive ballot of the sizeable city wide membership. The new electoral system, the so-called 'closed list' formula, introduced for the 1999 European
Assembly campaign attracted considerable opposition from across the political spectrum.
Supporters and opponents of electoral reform united in condemning the rule revision. The legislation was attacked in parliament and at one stage it looked possible it might not proceed through the House of Lords were it was mercilessly dissected by Conservative spokespeople.
Many believed the principle of voting for a regional party list conflicted with the British tradition of electors being able support a single named candidate. Others expressed disquiet about the potential divisiveness of the proposed system. The use of rankings, it was argued, would further a party leadership's influence over the process of candidate selection.
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There were four principle stages in the selection of Labour candidates for the European Assembly. In the initial phase all sitting MEPs were consulted as to whether they wished their names to go forward. Each of the soon to be dissolved European constituency parties were invited to endorse their sitting MEP and nominate and then vote for one man and one woman to go forward to the final selection. The next stage consisted of an OMOV ballot to determine 5 The new system meant Labour needed to select candidate lists for 11 of the 12 UK regions (the exception being Northern Ireland). These are (with the number of seats in brackets): Scotland (8); North (4); North West (10); Yorkshire and Humberside (7); Wales (5); West Midlands (8); East Midlands (6); Eastern (8); South West (7) Greater London (10); South East (11).
who amongst those shortlisted should go forward. Given more names went forward than list places existed, it was perhaps inevitable that there would be some disappointment.
The last two phases of the process proved to be the most contentious. For the third stage candidates had to complete a questionnaire detailing their experiences and motivations.
Assistant General Secretary David Gardner and another regional official graded the reportedly 'nameless' papers. The records and performances of sitting MEPs were also evaluated. The final element in the convoluted selection procedure involved the convening of NEC endorsed panels of national and regional officials and representatives. Candidates were interviewed, invited to make a presentation and also cross-examined in a mock press conference to ascertain their political outlook and media aptitude.
The selection procedure produced a set of marks for each candidate. These were collated and a 'consensus' meeting of officials and representatives convened to determine the rankings. The committee had a wide and influential remit given it was reportedly able to protect existing 'talent', foster the interests of women and minority nominees, and also 'shoehorn' candidates onto other regional lists. incident to censor colleagues' public utterances: 'Every member of the frontbench must check their policy statements and adhere to our policy making process'.
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The flurry of publicity surrounding the advert was enough to make three signatories almost immediately recant their previous support for the Falconer statement. They were eventual joined by four other colleagues. 13 The 
Results of the Selections.
If those MEPs who signed the Falconer statement are taken to be the supporters of 'old' Labour Clause Four, those who endorsed the rival David letter can be termed the 'new' group. In this way it will be possible to assess how both tendencies fared in terms of the rank position each 'extant' MEP obtained on their respective regional list. This variable was further dichotomised into positions '3 and above' and '4 and below'. Being ranked at 3 on a Labour party list did not guarantee a candidate would be elected because the regions differed in the numbers of Members they returned. Furthermore the different multi-member constituencies varied in their partisan allegiance. Consequently a ranking in one region did not automatically transfer to another in terms of marginality. However positions 3 and 4 appear suitable cut off points because they do suggest something about the likely electoral chances of a given candidate: those ranked in the higher bracket were much more likely (and did, in a majority of regions) become MEPs.
All those elected in 1994 were included in the study as were the two MEPs returned in byelections during the parliamentary session. The five candidates elected in 1999 for the first time were added to make a total sample of 69. 20 of these did not, for various reasons, contest the elections as Labour candidates because they had retired or fallen out with the party. In Tables 1 to 4 these ex-MEPs are listed as 'not standing'. Table 1 suggests Labour is making some progress in its bid to increase its compliment of women MEPs. Men still, however, outnumber the women in our dataset by a ratio of approximately 2:1. Crucially though 80% of the female candidates of the those in the sample who stood were ranked '3 or above' in their list as opposed to only 59% of the male contingent.
The small number of 3 Asian or Black politicians in the sample make it difficult to make any conclusive judgement about ethnic minority representation except to say, with two MEPs, it had in effect doubled. Table 5 shows the results of running a logistic regression analysis. This was done to allow an estimation of the probability that being in the 'new' Labour category would greatly enhance a candidate's chance of being selected in the '3 or above' section of a list. Moreover logistic regression technique was chosen because the dependent variable, 'position on list', was dichotomous. 18 The Table suggests that there is a greater probability of 'ideological position' rather than age, race, gender or cohort (year MEP entered parliament) being the factor that most determines whether a candidate is placed in the category '3 or above'. The NEWLAB variable is the only significant one at the .05 level (.0236).
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TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Conclusion: Liquidating the Left?
The elections for the new, devolved Scottish parliament and Welsh Assembly have understandably attracted considerable media coverage. The procedures Labour used to select its candidates for both bodies were selected attracted particular controversy and speculation.
Similarly the European elections, held a month later, offer an opportunity for a reappraisal and assessment of the extent to which the party leadership has been able to influence the process of it is speculating whether there will be any internal opposition from a parliamentary grouping who will be conscious that they, in part, own their selection to the leadership. 
